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“I know that the molecules in my body are traceable to phenomena in the cosmos. . . . That 
excites me. That makes me want to grab people on the street and say: ‘Have you HEARD 
THIS?”  –  astrophysicist  Neil  deGrasse  Tyson  in  a  talk  given  at  the  Beyond  Belief  
Conference, 2006
There is profound reconfiguration going on in scientifically oriented minds – reconfiguration of the 
models of human existence and practice. This is rather dramatically explicated by the popularity of 
charismatic  scientists  such  as  Neil  deGrasse  Tyson,  quoted  above.  The  enthusiastic  force  of 
deGrasse Tyson’s rhetoric resonates with people who are searching not only for explanations, but 
for meaning: it actually does have the effect of grabbing people in the street and shaking them to 
feel the awesomeness of the cosmos in their own bodies. In May 2014, his Facebook page has 1.44 
million followers, his Twitter account 1.97 million.  Scientific theories, and observations made by 
natural sciences, inspire and effect people, changing not only the way they think but also the ways 
they perceive themselves and relate to each other. This is nothing new. It is new, however, that the 
articulated call for alternatives to the totemic image of Man – as an autonomous, unitary subject and 
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the  master  of  all  things  natural  –  can  now be  heard  in  public  discussions  rather  than  just  in 
postmodern  cultural  discourse.  The  capitalized  “Man”  no  longer  provides  a  useful  model  for 
identification  –  rather,  there  is  an  acute  need  for  non-anthropocentric  models  of  thought  and 
practice. In search of a functional model of operating in the complex technological, ecological and 
social environments, many people turn to science – and scientists, such as deGrasse Tyson, who can 
craft information into intuitively meaningful sentences.
Some people take the additional step of approaching science through cultural criticism. The 
paradigmatic  shift  from  humanist  and  idealist  models  of  thought  to  scientific  and  materialist 
thinking has not passed humanists unnoticed: it  is the driving force behind many contemporary 
philosophical  approaches,  such  as  the  different  critiques  of  classical  humanism  (see  Soper, 
Sheehan),  and  interdisciplinary  work  in  fields  such  as  ecocriticism,  cognitive  literary  studies, 
Darwinist literary studies, literature and science, animal studies and feminist science studies (see 
Åsberg  et  al  222).  Conversations  about  the  ideologies  and  assumptions  present  in  scientific 
discourse and practices have been lead for decades by critics such as N. Katherine Hayles, Evelyn 
Fox Keller and Donna J. Haraway.
Still, there is more work to be done. One of the areas that call for a more detailed mapping is 
the construction and mutation of subjective experience, especially in the literature most interested in 
the scientific mode of thought: science fiction. In contemporary philosophy, there are innumerable 
theoretical approaches to subjectivity, and the modern and postmodern representations of subjective 
experience have been thoroughly studied in scholarship focusing on “mainstream” literary fiction. 
The study of science fiction, however, has not taken up the challenge in quite the same way – partly 
due  to  the  preconception  that  science-fictional  characters  are  not  interesting,  philosophically 
speaking. They have been dubbed  as flat rather than round, types rather than individuals, mere 
devices for presenting ideas and plot (see Mandala 119–124, Jones 171).
This may be true in many cases. However, there are works of science fiction that speculate 
not  only about  technological  progression or scientific  theories,  but  also about  the potential  and 
alternative developments of human subjectivity. I suggest that in the early novels of British writer 
Simon Ings, subjectivity is rewritten in particularly interesting ways. Ings' novels Hot Head (1992) 
and Hotwire (1995), combining technological speculation and gritty milieus with neurophilosophy 
and metafictional narration, can be characterized as late cyberpunk. Although Ings has been lauded 
as an original voice in the field of science fiction (and later as a writer of postmodern fiction closer 
to the literary mainstream) his work has not previously received attention from critics within the 
academy.
The  primary goal of the article is to show how  ideas derived from second-order systems 
theory and cognitive science are involved in the represented experience of fictional characters, and 
how this process relates to the concept of “posthuman” In particular, I focus on analyzing how the 
model of subjects as complex systems evokes a sense of posthuman subjectivity. I argue that 1) 
science  fiction  literature  is  essential  for  understanding  the  on-going  reassessment  of  human 
subjectivity  in  relation to  non-human systems, and 2)  that  Ings’ novels  Hot Head and  Hotwire 
provide a particularly profound model of posthuman subjectivity. All in all, the article is an attempt 
at applying a posthumanist approach to the study of literature.
The method of analysis in this article is far from perfect. There are brilliant analytical tools 
and concepts developed in cognitive narratology and cognitive stylistics, and utilizing them would 
definitely  provide  a  deeper  understanding  of  represented  experience.  However,  at  the  time  of 
conducting my analyses, I was still unsure of the ideological underpinnings of these approaches, 
and wanted to avoid blind commitment to traditions. As a result, except for the occasional use of 
narratological  concepts,  the  reading  follows  loose  intuitive  logic  based  on metaphorical  and 
analogical thinking. I am tracing certain structures of thought – resonant similarities between Ings’ 
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narration  and  scientific  theories.  This  logic  is  inspired  by  the  insightful  readings  made  by  N. 
Katherine Hayles (in How We Became Posthuman) and Sherryl Vint (in Bodies of Tomorrow).
The  questioning also  employs  a phenomenological mode:  what  could  it  mean,  on  the 
experiential  level,  to  be  posthuman? I  approach  fictional  characters  as  potential  models  for 
subjectivity – as experimental positions for a curious reader. I am well aware that this immersive 
approach  involves  the  risk  of  antropomorphizing  textual  constructs.  I  find  the  risk  not  only 
acceptable,  but  necessary.  For  me,  the  reflective  flickering  between  alternative  perspectives  – 
reading characters as people and as processes – is an integral part of the job description of a literary 
researcher.
The article involves a heavy load of references to scientific theorization. Even though my 
approach allows for no in-depth analysis of most theoretical aspects, I find it necessary to work 
towards  a synthesis that  involves perspectives  from both natural  sciences and humanities.  This 
stance is dictated by the source material at hand: in order to fully appreciate the complexity of this 
sort  of science fiction,  the research needs to be informed by a  multitude of approaches.  In his 
fiction, Simon Ings samples the theories of complex systems and cognition and integrates them into 
a  postmodern  literary  narrative.  To  leave  out  the  natural-scientific  aspect  of  this  elaborate 
construction would be neglectful. By utilizing multiple perspectives – provided by second-order 
systems theory, the philosophy of neuroscience and posthumanist theory – I also hope to convey 
some of the challenges ingrained in the posthumanist mode of thought.
Posthumanist Thought and the Search for Posthuman Subjectivities
The crisis of humanism has informed new conceptions of embodied human subjects – as biological 
and phenomenological, social and environmental beings. In recent years, theorization identifying as 
posthumanist has worked towards modeling subjectivity in ways that can acknowledge the many 
roles non-human entities and systems play in the formation of subjectivity. Posthumanist models of 
subjectivity have  drawn  on  both  the  tradition  of  systems-theoretical  (cybernetic)  thinking  and 
poststructuralist philosophical discourse. As a result, the models often emphasize the processual and 
material aspects of subjectivity.
Despite differences in disciplinary background and methodology, the common ground for 
contemporary posthumanist thinkers seems to be the critique of certain dualist and idealist strains in 
the tradition of humanism. Whether posthumanist thinking focuses on questions of nonhuman and 
animal  agency  and  the  feminist  critique  of  scientific  practices  (see  Åsberg  et  al.)  or  the 
systems-theoretical approaches to culture and fiction (Clarke,  Posthuman Metamorphosis; Wolfe), 
there  is  an  ongoing  search  for  theories  and  models  of  subjectivity  that  can  articulate  life, 
consciousness,  action and emotion in materialist  and non-anthropocentrist  terms. In this  search, 
posthumanist thinkers often engage in conversation with natural sciences and technology studies 
(with variable amounts of interdisciplinary critique). The tradition of interdisciplinarity goes back to 
the early development of cybernetics in the 1940s, and especially to the Macy Conferences that 
brought together scholars from fields ranging from psychology and anthropology to mathematical 
physics and information technology (see Hayles, Clarke and Hansen).1
The “post” in “posthumanism” should not be considered as a total break from the tradition 
of  humanism,  but  as  a  critical  deconstruction  of  it  –  in  the  sense  of  Lyotard’s  paradoxical 
1     Another major current of influence to posthumanist thought consists of the work of materialist and empiricist philosophers –  
from Leibniz, Hume and Spinoza to Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari. This genealogy has lead to coining the term “new materialism”,  
referring to a philosophical approach intertwined with posthumanist thought. Posthumanist discussions (especially the strains that  
emphasize animal ethics) are also closely linked to different forms of cultural activism such as the animal rights movement and deep  
ecology.  For  two  exemplary  accounts  on  genealogies  of  posthumanism,  see  Neil  Badmington's  introduction  to  the  reader  
Posthumanism and the editors’ introduction to NORA Magazine's issue on “post-humanities”.
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postmodernism that  happens  both  before  and  after  modernism (Wolfe  xiv-xv)  or  as  a  critical 
position inescapably rooted in humanist assumptions and language (Rabinowitz 42–43). In Cary 
Wolfe’s formulation, posthumanism happens “before” humanism
in the sense that it names the embodiment and embeddedness of the human being in not just  
its  biological  but  also  its  technological  world,  the  prosthetic  coevolution  of  the  human 
animal with the technicity of tools and external archival mechanisms (such as language and 
culture) . . . and all of which comes before that historically specific thing called 'the human' 
that Foucault's archaelogy excavates (xv).2
On the  other  hand,  posthumanism happens  “after”  humanism as  the  historical  phenomenon  of 
reconceptualizing the human as entangled in technological, medical, informational and economic 
networks – and the call for a new paradigm of thought to account for these entanglements (xv-xvi).
Often (but not always) the posthumanist discussion is centered around the term “posthuman” 
– both as a general adjective implying a mode of thought and practice that rewrites the meaning of 
the  word “human” and  as  a  speculative  figure,  “the  posthuman” In  both  syntactic  forms,  the 
posthuman evokes a plethora of alternatives to current models of humanity and subjectivity. In the 
discussions emphasizing the liberating aspects of technology, the posthuman is a futuristic figure 
that  has  transcended  the  boundaries  of  nature,  finitude  and  biological  embodiment:  “the  fully 
technologized successor species to organic Homo sapiens” (Graham 9).  This transhumanist notion 
of  inevitable  advent  of  the  superhuman  is  what  Elaine  Graham  wanted  to  question  with  her 
formulation “post/human”, to which she attributes a dual function: “The post/human is that which 
both confounds but also holds up to scrutiny the terms on which the quintessentially human will be 
conceived” (11). The dual function makes the post/human an analytical device, a shifting node in a 
dynamic  web  of  conversation.  This  nonessentialist  view  has  been  quite  popular  among 
posthumanist scholars after Graham's formulation. It is also what makes the term posthuman – even 
without  the  cautionary  forward slash – so  useful  for  philosophical  discussion.  In  posthumanist 
thought, “posthuman” denotes above all a change in conceptualizing human subjectivity.
In this article, the use of the terms “posthuman” and “posthuman subjectivity” carries the 
full  weight  of  the  contexts  and  functions  discussed  above  –  and  hopefully  adds  to  it.  Adding 
“subjectivity” to “posthuman” is in itself quite problematic, as R. L. Rutsky, among others, has 
noted. ”The subject” has traditionally signified the one in control, the ruler of a world of objects. To 
control or to be controlled, to be the subject or an object – this dualism has prevailed. According to 
Rutsky, overcoming this dualism is a central challenge to posthumanist thought:
[T]he human subject can only conceive of itself in opposition to the random, just as it seeks  
to control the body, dominate the material world, and narrativize history. On the other hand,  
any notion of the posthuman that is to be more than merely an extension of the human, that  
is to move beyond the dialectic of control and lack of control, superhuman and inhuman,  
must be premised upon a mutation that is ongoing and immanent. From this perspective, 
there can be no such thing as a posthuman subject - at least, not in the traditional sense of an 
individualized, unitary and autonomous subject. (Rutsky 111.)
The problem of posthuman subjectivity is also approached in second-order systems theory – or, as 
Bruce  Clarke and Mark B.  N.  Hansen prefer  to  call  it,  neocybernetics.  Neocybernetics,  highly 
uninterested  in  individualized  subjects,  shifts  the  emphasis  of  observation  to  the  networks  of 
connections among systems and environments, both living and nonliving. From this perspective, the 
subject  appears  to  be  only  a  convention  of  Western  metaphysics,  “an  amalgamation”  or  a 
2     Andy Clark would even claim that this very openness to “multiple mergers and coalitions” is what distinguishes Homo sapiens as 
a species (Natural Born Cyborgs 7).
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“noumenal unity” which deserves no further attention. (Hansen 6.) It is important to note that in 
systems theory, the definition of a system always involves selection: the boundaries that define a 
system such as  “a  human individual”  are  dependable  on  the  question  you want  to  ask.  For  a 
neocyberneticist, the subject is only a matter of distinction: instead of an individual, one can decide 
to focus on the various psychic and social systems that constitute an individual, or on the interaction 
and  collaboration  between  an  individual  and  its  environment.  The  individual  is  dividable  and 
mergeable. What makes this shift of emphasis urgent in the eyes of the neocyberneticists is the 
increasing complexification of the living environment.
In  today's  computational  world,  countless  instances  of  human  agency  –  even  those  as  
mundane  as  making online credit  card and mortgage payments,  monitoring  information 
about the weather or the stock market, even writing letters and sending messages – occur 
against  the  backdrop of  complex computational  infrastructures,  which geographer  Nigel 
Thrift has christened with the felicitous name of the “technological unconscious”. (Hansen 
117.)
For  Hansen,  the  central  challenge  for  contemporary  cultural  theorists  involves  the  inevitable 
hybridity  of  systems  and  environments:  how  to  both  recognize  the  certain  consistency  of  the 
“human mindbody” and to  account  for  the certain  non-autonomy resulting  from its  reliance  to 
informationally complex environments (ibid.). Hansen's proposal for accounting for this dynamic is 
the concept of “system-environment hybrids” or “SEHs” couplings that “realize their autonomy . . . 
through a constitutive relation with alterity”.  In SEHs, the environmental component cannot be 
considered as merely supportive of or trivial to the system. (115.)
In  cultural  theory,  the  unavoidable  and  constitutive  relation  to  the  (technological) 
environment  has  been  approached  through  concepts  such  as  the  cyborg  and  the  hybrid. 
Neomaterialist  theorist  Rosi  Braidotti  addresses  the  contingency  of  systemic  boundaries  by 
suggesting that the formation of subjectivity (on an experiential level) also involves a process of 
distinction  and  selection.  In Braidotti’s  poetic  formulation,  the  experience  of  any  unitary 
subjectivity,  of  a  grammatical  “I”,  is  a “fictional  choreography” (Metamorphoses 22).  Braidotti 
writes:
The subject is a process, made of constant shifts and negotiations between different levels of 
power and desire, that is to say wilful choice and unconscious drives. Whatever semblance 
of unity there may be, is no God-given essence, but rather the fictional choreography of  
many levels into one socially operational self. (Ibid.)
In this line of thought, every self is fictional – constructed and operated according to models or 
schemas  that  are,  in  turn,  constructed  and  transformed  by  social,  cultural,  psychological  and 
biological  forces  (Metamorphoses  13). Despite  the  notion  of  fictionality,  Braidotti  still  sees 
subjectivity as a valuable ethical and political category. She even promotes the idea of “alternative 
figurations”  or  conceptual  personae  (in  the  deleuzian  sense)  as  empowering  or  affirmative 
“signposts for specific geopolitical and historical locations” (Posthuman  164). The constructivist 
view on subjectivity can be used as an opportunity for intentional change.
Considered together, these theories pose a challenge. Even if one accepts the idea of the 
subject as a process or an effect produced in the network of multiple systems and environments,  
will it  always remain just that – an idea, an intellectual exercise? Can the posthumanist models of 
subjectivity actually be experienced subjectively? And, translated into a problem specific for the 
study of literature: can these models ever take the form of an identifiable literary character, when 
characters tend to be just that: individualized, unitary and autonomous, caught in the dialectic of 
control and lack of control?
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These  questions  call  for  a  deeper  analysis  of  the  relations  between  the  traditions  of 
humanism and modernity and the conventional form of literary character – a continuation of the 
work already started by such scholars as Daniel Punday, Genie Babb and David Porush. However, 
due to the restrictions of time and format, I must now approach them with a more thematic reading 
of Simon Ings' novels Hot Head and Hotwire. I start with an introduction to the representations of 
non-human systems and cognition in cyberpunk literature.
Cyberpunk and Cognitive Science 
In  English-language popular  culture,  non-human intelligence  has  traditionally  been  depicted  as 
threatening – whether it resides in technological, institutional or biological systems. The relation 
between a human individual and a non-human system has typically been that of opposition. Just 
think of such iconic fictions as Brave New World or The Matrix – both setting the original human 
personality against a nonpersonal threat. The function of the hero has been to resist assimilation 
(even when it is futile) and retain his individuality at all costs. In science-fictional literature, notable 
reactions to the apparent rise of non-human systems are paranoia about origins, as in Philip K. 
Dick's and William S. Burroughs' oeuvres (see Butler), and a form of escapism that hovers between 
technophilia  and  technophobia,  as  in  gibsonian  cyberpunk.3 As  a  counterreaction  to  the 
anthropocentric  heroism  of  1970’s  sf  literature,  the  genre  of  cyberpunk  problematized  the 
relationship  between human subjects  and their  technological  others.  In  particular,  it  mockingly 
questioned the position of Man as the master of both nature and technological systems. For the 
cyberpunk protagonist, this often meant the loss of autonomy and control – and in some cases, also 
the loss of a unitary self-image. (See McGuirk, Slusser, Bukatman.)
Cyberpunk is often regarded as particularly hostile towards embodiment and materiality. 
Many cyberpunk texts  depict  the  self-dissolving  integration  to  computing  systems as  a  sort  of 
nirvana,  as  liberation  from  the  constraints  of  flesh.  As  many  critics  have  noted,  this  is  a 
transhumanist view – it seeks not to decentralize or redefine the human subject but to extrapolate on 
it, resulting in superhuman or inhuman figures, not posthumans. (See Hayles, Wolmark, Parikka.) 
As Carol McGuirk has noted, the most novel feature of cyberpunk as a subgenre was its orientation 
towards the interior: whereas the tradition of “hard science fiction” sent its ships to explore outer 
space, cyberpunk turned to examine the vulnerable inner space of the human mind (114–115). This 
orientation is apparent also in Ings’ work. What sets him apart from most cyberpunk writers is his  
remarkable  interest  towards  phenomenological  embodiment  and  cognitive  science.  Indeed,  in 
reading Ings, a basic understanding of recent developments in cognitive science  appears not only 
useful but crucial. Therefore, a short summary is needed.
In the classical  theory of mind,  the brain is  the seat  of human consciousness:  a  central 
commander, the subject in a world of objects. However, recent models have also emphasized the 
embodied  and  environmental  aspects of cognitive activity, decentering the rational and conscious 
self. Andy Clark summarizes this process as a three-stage progression: The first stage (classical  
cognitivism) depicted the mind in terms of a central logic engine, symbolic databases and some 
peripheral “sensory” models. The key characteristics of this vision included the ideas of memory as 
retrieval from a stored symbolic database, problem solving as logical inference and cognition as 
centralized. The environment was seen just as a problem domain and the body as an input device.  
The  connectionist  view  replaced  these  characteristics  with  the  ideas  of  memory  as  pattern 
3     Of course, opposition is not the only way of articulating relations between humans and non-human systems in science fiction.  
There are literary works, such as Octavia E. Butler's Xenogenesis series, that posit the human subject as an integral part of a larger  
techno-biological  ecology  –  works  that  do  not  determine  subjectivity  through modern  notions  of  originality,  individuality  and  
autonomy. In Butler's texts, human subjectivity is produced in social and ecological processes. In this regard, Simon Ings' Hot Head 
and Hotwire are similar to Butler's work.
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re-creation,  problem solving as pattern completion and pattern transformation,  and cognition as 
increasingly  decentralized.  The third  turn  – the  emergentist  perspective – also took account  of 
embedded and embodied cognition: the environment is seen as an active resource whose intrinsic 
dynamics  can  play  important  problem-solving  roles,  and  the  body  is  seen  as  part  of  the 
computational loop. Cognition is viewed, not as something  “internal” but as a process that takes 
place in the complex interactions of body, world and brain. (Being There 83–84.) The third turn has 
also  been  called  embodied  dynamicism  by  Evan  Thompson.  As  Thompson  notes,  all  three 
approaches coexist in contemporary research, both separately and in hybrid forms. (Mind in Life 4.)4
Datafat and Models of Cognition in Hot Head
Simon Ings'  Hot Head (1992) can be considered as a literary application of the progression from 
disembodied  central  cognition  to  embodied  distributed  cognition.  Written  at  a  time  when  the 
embodied  approach  was  just  gaining  a  foothold  in  cognitive  sciences  and  the  philosophy  of 
neuroscience (The Embodied Mind by Varela, Thompson and Rosch was published in 1991), Ings' 
novel describes the change of human subjectivity in relation to a series of computational systems. 
The virtual realities Ings envisions start from relatively logical command-control-systems and build 
up  into  rich  complexities  that  cannot  be  consciously  controlled  by  either  human  or  artificial 
intelligence. Still, the characters in  Hot Head strive for some form of control over environmental 
complexity, even a partial one – and end up using intuitive methods that are described as “magic”.
From a systems-theoretical  perspective,  this  process  could  be  described as  reducing the 
complexity of the environment in order to function. The process is tied to the neocybernetic concept 
of  emergence  as  movement  from  the  chaotically  complex  to  the  manageably  complex:  any 
particular  system  that  emerges  within  an  environment  is  necessarily  less  complex  than  that 
environment. In order to maintain its functionality and perpetuate itself, a system cannot process the 
whole  complexity  of  the  environment.  It  needs  to  maintain  the  processes  of  selection  and 
generalization – there is no perception without cognitive models and categories. (Clarke and Hansen 
10–12.)
In the corrupt, technology-driven and islamized early 21st Europe of Hot Head, the central 
character Malise Arnim is a cybernetic soldier implanted with a programmable cerebral tissue called 
datafat.  There are two wars,  both staged between humanity and a technological other:  the first 
enemy is a conglomeration of mining robots in the Moon, driven to unexplainable rampage against 
the Earth (bombing down all major cities before being stopped), the other against a similar but 
bigger AI threat originating in Jupiter. As the enemies become more complex, so does the military 
technology used to enhance the soldiers.
Malise is taken through a series of transformations that restructure her subjectivity according 
to the computational systems she is coupled with. From the start, she is written as the object of 
manipulation – by her father, by her lover Seval, by the psychiatric institution that turns her into a 
soldier via a restorative video game, by the military that enhances her with datafat and removes it 
after the first war, and most prominently by Snow, the transhumanist Frankenstein-character who 
develops the second-generation datafat and uses it to turn Malise into what she considers the next 
step  in  evolution:  “It’s  inevitable,  unstoppable,  as  natural  an  evolutionary  progression  as  the 
opposable thumb or walking upright” (HH 256–257). Malise is a typical cyberpunk protagonist: 
gifted, traumatized, abused and addicted. Unlike some of the more technophilic caricatures, though, 
her suffering is not alleviated by the immersion in virtual reality technologies. Instead, she finds 
4     “For cognitivism, the metaphor is the mind as digital computer;  for connectionism, it is  the mind as neural network; for  
embodied dynamicism, it is the mind as an embodied dynamic system.” (Mind in Life 4.)
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that the symbolic structures that form the base of her personality continue to define her, throughout 
the transformations into enhanced transhumanity and virtual existence.
As the name suggests, datafat is programmable yet organic matter. The tissue functions first 
as an extension of the human mind, then as a replacement for it. Primarily, it is a control system for  
weapons technology. However, as both the datafat and the enemy intelligence evolve, the datafat 
becomes a tool for creating artificial persons and worlds. As a narrative device, datafat is a tool for  
cognitive  estrangement  –  by  replacing  the  “natural”  brain  with  versions  of  datafat,  Ings  can 
experiment  with different  theories  of  mind.  The first-generation datafat,  operated via  conscious 
control  of  icons,  articulates  the relation  between the  program and the operator  in  terms of  the 
classical theory of mind:
To  aid  her  in  her  mission,  Malise  has  with  her  some  drones,  monitors  and  gash-built  
peripherals  which  she  controls  via  the  datafat  in  her  skull.  She  pictures  an  icon  and  a 
menuscape meshes over her vision. She whispers her choice of equipment and the mesh fills  
with data, graphics and statistics. (HH 59.)
Hovering just before her was the tree-like icon of her virus. . . . [T]his quick-to-understand  
symbolic landscape gave her a visual representation of what it could do. It looked right. (HH 
70.)
In  classical  cognitivism,  the  central  metaphor  for  the  mind  is  the  digital  computer.  Cognitive 
activity  is  conceptualized  as  the  formal  manipulation  of  symbols.  Meaning  is  representational, 
objectively present in the relation between signifier and signified. (See Varela et al 40-43; Mind In 
Life 4–5.) This model of formal and disembodied thought is what is at work in the relation between 
Malise and the computer program in the above passages of Hot Head: Malise chooses an icon – a 
symbol – and the program responds with a pre-determined action. The operator exists in space as a 
disembodied point-of-view. This logic of symbolic operations forms the basis of Hot Head's model 
of mind, elaborated further in the next stages.5
The first version of datafat features the unconscious routines of the mind explicitly in the 
icon-based  interaction  between  Malise  and  the  computer.  With  the  introduction  of  the  second 
version  –  developed  by  the  neuroscientist  Snow  –  Ings  moves  towards  describing  a  more 
connectionist theory of mind. The transition to second-generation datafat is depicted as a painful 
transformation,  involving  neurosurgery  with  ritualistic  properties  –  in  Malise's  narration,  the 
technicians' strange jargon becomes an incantation, their screens scented fires. After surgery, Malise 
experiences a new sense of self:
Her idea of her self was changing, warping, and expanding to fill the new spaces within her.  
Her  homunculus  was  evolving  in  strange  new  directions  -  cancerous  swellings  and 
nightmare etiolations. I’ve killed myself, she thought, wildly. I’ve killed the human in me. 
(HH 99.)
Despite the killing of the self and the human in her, Malise is still an “I” – both grammatically and 
phenomenologically.  Even though she is well  aware of her self becoming a model of a person 
running inside a computational system, she still experiences this self as her self. Losing her original 
5     Classical cognitivism divided the mind into two separate regions: the subjective mental states of the person and the subpersonal 
cognitive routines implemented in the brain. This attempt at solving the mind-body problem (“how can a brain have experiences”)  
resulted  in  what  Ray  Jackendorff  has  called  the  “mind-mind”  problem  –  the  unexplainable  relation  between  unconscious 
computational states and conscious experience (Jackendorff 1987, 20 < Mind In Life 6). The cognitivist model offers no explanation 
for subjectivity or consciousness,  as it  focuses on the workings of the unconscious mind – which is depicted as a mechanical  
operating system, hovering beneath consciousness.
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form and giving  in  to  “cancerous  swellings  and  nightmare  etiolations”,  she  is  disoriented  and 
exhausted, but the change does not lead to a loss of subjectivity.
As  Malise  “updates”  her  operating  system  to  second-generation  datafat,  the  distinction 
between “operator” and “program” disappears. Malise's conscious mind is fully integrated into the 
system  as  a  subroutine.  The  system  still  uses  the  computational  capacity  of  her  brain  for  its  
operations,  but  Malise  no  longer  has  conscious  access  to  these  operations.  All  mental  action 
happens completely inside one datafat system that includes both artificial and human intelligence. 
In this system, it becomes possible for the artificial intelligence (datafat) and the human intelligence 
(or  the  model  thereof)  to  instantly  adapt  to  each  other.  On  the  subjective  level  of  Malise's  
consciousness,  these transformations take place in immersive virtual environments called  “story 
engines”:
What Snow's datafat does is read and model your whole intelligence. The operator does not work 
through Snow's datafat – the datafat models the operator and attempts to achieve a rest state 
between itself and its model. .  .  .  It's  like one of your battle'scapes only more complex.  It's 
running in the calculation spaces of our datafat. It's modelling us. You think you're you, but  
you're really only your datafat's model of you. (HH 169.)
If a narrative of a novel is considered a kind of virtual reality (as Jean Baudrillard has suggested, 
and as Ings' artistic choices also seem to suggest), then a virtual reality within a narrative can hardly 
avoid being metafictional. Ings' text openly embraces the philosophical conundrums brought on by 
metafictionality. As the focus of Malise's point-of-view shifts from her “original” self to that of a 
datafat  model,  she  becomes  a  model  of  a  person  running  inside  a  model  of  an  environment. 
Ironically, her operations in the environment become more dependent on her embodied action than 
they were in the enfleshed world. She can't control the environment with commands any more – all 
she can do is live in it:
[I]n a very real sense these places are stories, not landscapes. They’re designed to integrate the 
operator wholly within their structure, in time as well as in space. After a while one isn’t aware 
of  performing operations here – one simply lives here. One isn’t aware that  one is learning 
anything. The memes act in such a way that it seems one has always known how to use them. . . .  
The environment adapts itself around whoever inhabits it, like a story rewriting itself for each 
new reader. (HH 172.)
As tempting as the notion of metafictionality is, focusing on it would not further the cause of this  
article (there is a risk of it hijacking the whole discussion). A more useful way of reading these 
passages  is  to  treat  them as  unusually explicit  accounts  on phenomenological  perception.  Read 
through the computationalist theories of cognition, the virtual environment becomes a metaphorical 
elaboration on the phenomenological experience of the actual world. Malise – even in her “original” 
form – is constantly  “performing operations” and  “running models” but never expressing it with 
those terms. Phenomenologically, Malise is human – operationally, a machine. The only difference 
is that in the virtual world she is made aware of the existence of these subpersonal computations. By 
removing the “natural world” and replacing it with a “virtual reality”, Ings clears room for this 
phenomenological conception of perception.
The  idea  of  a  story  engine  also  entails  the  personal  narrative  construction  of  the 
phenomenological environment. The story engine subtly adapts to the assumptions and expectations 
of its inhabitants, altering them in the process. Malise is introduced to the story engines by a woman 
who has, in the course of subjective years, shaped a virtual world of her own:
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The landscape and its ghosts have shaped themselves the better to express my life here with 
Snow. My memories have been webbed to the fabric of the environment so that I can no 
longer say what is me and what is external to me. The tastes and smells of the ocean itself 
have taken on a private meaning. (HH 173.)
In story engines, the relation between cognitive processes and the environment is still viewed as 
representational  (memes  act  as  symbols  providing complex meanings  for  different  parts  of  the 
environment), but more dynamic than the unambiguous relations in first-generation datafat systems. 
The emphasis on the interactive learning processes in the distributed system highlights that the story 
engine is considered a neural network.
Adapting to Environmental Complexity
The third level of complexity in Hot Head involves a collective artificial intelligence the size of an 
asteroid – the Jovian Massive. Originally sent to Jupiter for mining purposes, these semi-intelligent 
non-human AI's have conglomerated, began to reproduce exponentially and left the planet in search 
for new hardware and electronics. The AI's endless appetite poses an apocalyptic threat to Earth.  
Along with other veterans of a previous AI war, Malise is sent to stop the Massive. This includes 
her physically entering its computational system and becoming a part of it – another model, now 
run by a different machine.
The environment inside the Jovian's mind is depicted as a large-scale neural network - “the 
kind of informational matrix that is suited less to the lives of individuals than to the modelling of 
whole civilizations” (HH 283). It is also labeled “insane”. The only functional way to operate in it is 
to intuitively engage in mythical and symbolic narratives – sacred quests, metamorphoses and ritual 
deaths. The complexity of these operations is overwhelming to human operators. The only suitable 
label  for  the  unconscious  computations  between  the  subjects-as-models  and  the 
world-as-operating-system appears to be “magic”.
Particularly important is the symbolic system of tarot. The Jovian uses it to make sense of 
Malise's personality. “The cards are useful. They act like a kind of . . . story engine. They are a 
tool-kit by which to describe personality.” (HH 292.) It is possible to use tarot this way because 
Malise's  personality has already in her youth been founded on its  symbols.  Malise's first  lover, 
Seval, has used tarot as a powerful codifier. In Hot Head, the reversed Papess card becomes a heavy 
cluster of personal symbolism, signifying all the violent experiences of her life: the death of her 
mother, the death of Seval, the previous war. Turning it round becomes an act of transformation – or 
reprogramming:
Seval pointed to the fourth card: ‘This is beneath you; upon this you are founded. Oh dear –’ It  
was the Papess reversed. ‘Lust. Enslavement. Belligerence. We can’t have that.’
She turned the card round.
‘Hey!’ Malise yelled, scandalized. ‘You can’t do that!’
Seval  looked  into  her  eyes.  Her  whole  face  seemed  old.  Not  decrepit  –  old.  Ancient, 
adamantine. ‘You wanna bet?’ (HH 143.)
In the climatic ending of Hot Head, the Jovian goes through Malise's personal history by re-running 
them through her subjective experience. Ings reuses the above tarot-reading scene almost verbatim, 
as  he  does  several  other  scenes  from  the  earlier  sections  of  the  story.  As  Amy,  the  Jovian's 
communication channel, puts it:  “The symbols which lie at the very root of your personality will 
explain your purpose and worth to the Jovian” (HH 292). Until the turning of the reversed Papess 
card, the reading follows the one made in the past by Seval. As the card is revealed, there is a 
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significant variation: frustrated with the machine intruding into her past, Malise turns the card over 
herself  –  which  leads  to  the  final  resolution  with  Jovian.  This  illustrates  rather  elegantly  the 
connectionist view of problem solving as pattern completion and pattern transformation. Form is 
inseparable from content: the complex weave of Ings' prose is repeated and slightly altered, as are 
Malise's memories and the configuration of the Jovian's mind.
Malise has no idea how the Jovian exactly uses this information to judge her character – but 
it is implied that the method is some form of complex computation. “I suppose stopping the Jovian 
was such a complex business, it took all my life experience to contain the necessary memes” (HH 
297).  However,  the  general  feel  invoked  here  and  throughout  the  story  is  that  of  magic  –  of 
incomprehensible and illogical happenings that still, on some unconscious level of cognition, make 
perfect sense. In young Malise's mind, magic forms the basic structure of the physical world:
Magic works, she thought. Magic does not come from outside the world - it is all around us,  
if only we knew how to look. It is not a thing. It is simply the way the world weaves itself 
before our eyes. We obey the weave; we look in the right directions and the world seems 
solid. (HH 43.)
“Magic” is,  of course,  just  one way of  naming unintelligible  phenomena.  To quote the old SF 
proverb known as Clarke's Third Law: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable 
from magic.”6 In Hot Head, magic appears as an intuitive explanation for environmental complexity 
– and a strategy for addressing it. From a neocybernetic perspective, the function of tarot in  Hot 
Head could be viewed as a means of reducing the complexity of the environment that is the Jovian 
system. Ings' “magic” could be considered as an intuitive technology – a means of addressing “the 
way the world weaves itself”, even without analytically understanding it. The symbolic system of 
tarot serves as a tool-kit for the specific purpose of describing the complexity of a psychic system.
Even though Malise is produced as an integral part of AI systems, as a character she still 
contains a certain nostalgia for individuality and originality. The symbolic order determining the 
narrative logic of her life posits her as the warrior character, the war hero – and throughout the 
story, she has strived to become that hero. The final resolution between herself and the Jovian  is 
therefore anticlimactic and she is left without a purpose in the world. “[I]t doesn't feel like winning. 
I'd hoped I would get to press its stop button. As it is, I was the button it pressed to stop itself.” (HH 
298.) Born and culturally inscribed as human, Malise cannot willingly become posthuman. For a 
deeper vision of posthumanity, Ings has to come up with another character: Hotwire’s Rosa.
Technological Ecosystems in Hotwire
Set in the same fictional universe as  Hot Head, Hotwire  (1995) also illustrates the embodied and 
enactive views of distributed cognition. Where Hot Head addresses the modeling of cognition and 
the symbolic construction of subjectivity, Hotwire's focus is on life and its emergent properties.
In  the  speculative  historical  situation  of  Hotwire,  the  world  teeters  on  the  brink of 
technological singularity. Human subjects have been made largely redundant by massive artificial 
intelligences who handle all major analytical and administrative tasks. As the Massives gain more 
power  and  coherence  of  will,  the  humans  are  rapidly  reduced  to  the  state  of  “fleas  trying  to 
second-guess their dogs” (HW 96). It is not only human-made AI's, but cities and seas too, that 
emerge as cognizant subjects. As in the wildest transhumanist dreams, the whole material world 
seems to be “waking up” due to the increase in computational power (see Kurzweil 33, 265–266).
6     See TV Tropes: http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/ClarkesThirdLaw
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Massives also have the power of producing new biological creatures from scratch. One of 
the two protagonists of Hotwire, Rosa, is an artificial girl produced inside a Massive. This Massive, 
a  rogue  orbital  space  station  called  Dayus  Ram, is  referred  to  as  Rosa's  Mother.  From  this 
womb-like state, she is transferred to Earth by the other protagonist, Ajay. Ajay is a reluctant hero 
character,  similar  to  Hot  Head’s Malise  Arnim in  many  aspects:  he  is  also  a  “hired  gun”,  a 
component of a superhuman machinery of violence. Like Malise, he is also denied the resolution of 
a heroic narrative: by the end of the story, he is made to realize that for his whole life, he has been 
controlled  by the needs  of  other  people  and institutions. Ajay  also plays  the human to Rosa’s 
posthuman:  the  posthuman  aspects  of  Rosa’s  character  are  brought  out  by  the  contrasting 
perspectives.
Rosa's Mother is at once a womb, a mind and an ecosystem: a bio-technological laboratory, 
constantly producing and re-producing novel forms of enfleshed posthumans. Only a small fraction 
of these creations are made in Dayus Ram's conscious parts, others are of unconscious origin. They 
take on all the grotesque, sublime and abject forms of speculative posthumanity: talking animals, 
angels, balls of cancerous tissue inhabited by collective minds. Rosa herself is but one possible 
outcome of  the  process  of  creation,  temporal  and  contingent  as  the  rest  of  the  odd creatures. 
Roaming the dusty rooms of her mother's unconscious parts, she too is reduced to the scale of fleas 
and even microbes:
A fish cannot imagine 'sea'. A tree snake cannot picture 'forest'. A foetus does not know its  
mother's  shape.  Rosa,  living  here,  lived  still  in  her  mother's  womb.  She  had,  as  a 
consequence,  no  image  of  her  mother.  She  could  no  more  understand  her  ma  than  a 
bacterium in her gut could know her. (HW 47.)
From a systems-theoretical perspective, Rosa can be considered a subsystem. Like Malise in  Hot 
Head, she can be described as an  “animate calculator” (HH 253), an integral and oblivious part 
emerging from a complex whole. In the passage above, her inability to process the complexity of 
the environment is made strikingly clear. In Hotwire, however, this logic acquires a more visceral 
effect  due  to  ecological  metaphors  and  excessive  descriptions  of  Massive-made  flesh.  For  the 
purposes of this article, the most important aspects of the novel are the technological connectivity of 
Rosa's biological body and the peculiar nature of the agency this connectivity brings with it.
Intelligent Flesh and Emergent Consciousness
The bodies of Rosa and other Ma's creations are fashioned from a novel brand of datafat. A few 
decades of experimenting by mad scientists (both human and non-human, including  Hot Head's 
Snow who now rules the world as the primary operating system for emerging AI cities) has resulted 
in  intelligent  flesh,  capable  of  connecting  and  communicating  with  one's  technological 
environment. As Rosa finds out in a communication loop with a Massive, every cell of her body is 
made of datafat: “You're all 'fat, little one. All Massive flesh. Each flake of skin. Each cell.” (HW 
270.)
In  Rosa's  phenomenological  experience,  the  capabilities  of  her  intelligent  flesh  are 
independent of her rational consciousness. Inside her Mother, she is an instinctive being, devoid of 
individual language or thought, acting without conscious decision. Once she is brought to Earth, her 
body continues to confuse her – it does not function in the same way as do the bodies of Earth-born 
humans. Rosa becomes conscious of her receptibility to electromagnetic waves: as she turns off the 
radio,  the  song  keeps  on  playing  in  her  head.  She  instinctively  operates  everyday  appliances, 
vehicles and weapons by “minding” them, sometimes without consciously willing to. Her abilities 
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are compared with sexual desire and enhanced by affects like anger and fear. “I don't really know 
how I do it. I do it is all.” (HW303.) It is not her brain alone that connects and computes, it is the 
entirety of her body, both the conscious and the unconscious aspects of it.
As  in  Hot  Head,  datafat  functions  as  a  tool  for  cognitive  estrangement.  It  enables  a 
detachment from the traditional dualist model of mind and body, as well as the “skullbound” model 
of  classical  cognitivism.  As  we  saw above,  it  cunningly  reroutes  the  reader's  attitude  towards 
embodiment by building on the well-established science (fiction) trope “the brain is a computer”. At 
first, datafat is a cognitive enhancement, an interface tissue, supposedly operating analogically to 
cells in a human nervous system. Once this is established in Hot Head, it now becomes possible to 
invent bodies constructed completely of intelligent material, resulting in a model where every cell is 
a computer – or matter with mind. Not exclusively human mind, however, but a mind pervasive in 
all matter – best exemplified by the emergent intelligence of Massive Presidio's body of water, a 
“thinking sea”:
She looked out the porthole. Sunlight skittered on the rippling water, like TV interference.
'You hear it?' he whispered.
'Just white noise.'
'Oh no.' He was sobbing openly now. 'Not noise. A harmony. So beautiful!'
'The sea?'
He nodded. 'Presidio!'
Rosa frowned. Which did he mean? Presidio or the sea? Or did he mean both? But how 
could the sound be both? What sound? What was he listening to? The rush of quanta from 
the sea, or some hidden rhythm? Natural music, or minded music?
And after all, she thought then, who's to say when chaos becomes mind? What stops the sea, 
as it signs its name in ripples on Waddell Beach, from thinking? May it not one day flux and 
give over scrawling in the sand, and start instead to manufacture eyes, fingernails, bags of 
blood and rolls of hair?
What  distinction made her  'artificial'  and Ajay 'natural'?  Could you not  say,  with equal  
rightness,  that  the Earth had mind to make the things it  made? Or that  Ma herself  was 
unthinking, a natural force merely, though supplied with handier tools?Flap went the waves.
Ajay as Earth's signature, Earth's ripple.
Flap.
Rosa, in her turn, as Ma's –
Troubled by thoughts that did not seem to come from her, Rosa lost her concentration and  
found  herself  looking  not  at  the  waves,  but  through  them,  at  deeper  patterns  of  light, 
correspondences, shapes, echoes... (HW 267–268.)
In this passage, there are two things that need addressing. Firstly, the form of narration. As Rosa 
connects to the sea, its mind merges with hers with a subtle glitch in the discourse. The glitch is  
located  at  “And  after  all,  she  thought  then”,  after  which  certain  poetic  grandiosity  enters  the 
discourse. Sophisticated phrases such as “could you not say” and “a natural force merely” are not 
present in the passages where Rosa’s mind is disconnected from the Massives. Rosa thinks with 
Presidio,  “thoughts  that  did  not  seem  to  come  from  her”.  In  this  form,  her  individuality  is 
renounced. As during her time inside Dayus Ram, her mind is constructed as an integral process of 
an environment.
The  second  thing  that  needs  addressing  is  the  philosophical  content  of  these  thoughts. 
Presidio  refutes  the  distinction  between  artificial  and  natural  life,  moving  from  the  dualist 
framework – indicated by the conjunctive “or” – to a view supporting continuity of life and mind. 
On a dynamical level, Presidio is the sea, much in the same way as Rosa is her body – the thinking 
subject is an effect of material existence and movement, the rhythm and ripple of waves. This is 
elaborated later in the “conversation” between Rosa and Presidio, when  “mind” is defined as an 
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emergent “side-effect of being”. “The more you are, the more you think. Of course the earth thinks, 
on one scale. And so do you. Xu's boat thinks too; just not a lot, is all.” (HW 269.)
In cognitive science and theoretical biology, the idea that life and mind share a set of basic 
organizational properties is known as the  “strong continuity thesis of life and mind”. Simply put, 
this thesis sees the distinctive properties of mind as an enriched version of those fundamental to life. 
In Evan Thompson's elaboration of Fransisco Varela's proposition, “living is sense-making”, every 
living system is considered as both an autopoietic and a cognitive system. This broad usage of the 
term “cognition” is meant to highlight the intentionality present in the enactive self-organisation of 
all  living  systems.  Even  the  simplest  motile  bacteria  “make  sense” of  the  world  through  their 
sensorimotor and metabolic activities: the environment of a bacterium is more organized than a 
world as an objective reality. The acts of moving and eating constitute both the bacterium (as an 
individual or a self) and the environment (as a domain of interactions proper to that self). (Life in  
Mind, 128–129, 158.)
This  is  the far  end of the emergentist  approach to cognition.  The proposition  “living is 
sense-making” reorganizes life and mind into a continuum: mind is life-like and life is mind-like. 
Similar ideas can be found in neomaterialist philosophy. For example, in the “vital materialism” of 
Rosi Braidotti, all matter is considered as affective and self-organizing. “Life” is not codified as the 
exclusive property of the human species but as a dynamic force that  “cuts across and reconnects 
previously segregated species, categories and domains”. This conception of life is signified by the 
word  zoe  –  as  opposed  to  bios,  the  discursive  and  intelligent  life  reserved  only  for  humans. 
(Metamorphoses 132, The Posthuman 60.)7
Despite never becoming a  “subject” in the sense of a unitary and autonomous individual, 
Rosa acquires a certain “competence with the world” (HW 251). This competence is not articulated 
in terms of control over other individuals or the environment, but in terms of adaptation.
Reminiscent of most teenage superheroes, Rosa's body is superhuman but her social self is 
not: she is constantly permeated by overwhelming technological, social and emotional influences. 
For the most part of the story, she is depicted as clumsy, awkward and ignorant. As the other central 
character of Hotwire, Ajay puts it, “Rosa was no goddess, monster, angel, ancient power; she was a 
girl” (HW  309).  On  a  conscious  and  discursive  level,  she  does  not  grasp  the  complexity  of 
processes permeating her – but she adapts to them and learns to work with them on an embodied 
and intuitive level. In a sense, Hotwire can even be considered as a variation of a Bildungsroman, 
telling the story of the socialization of a young person. However, in Rosa's case, the socialization is  
not only adapting to the norms and conventions of human society, but also coming to terms with 
other life on Earth – including the life of her own body. For Rosa,  “competence” includes the 
posthuman dimension of her senses, her ability to “reach out with her mind” towards all entangled 
systems of the technosphere.
One of the complex processes permeating Rosa’s body is the change induced by pregnancy. 
The originating event is described quite early on in the story – a symbolically loaded sexual scene 
featuring unconscious Ajay and one of Dayus Ram’s surgical operating rooms – but the issue does 
not re-emerge until Rosa begins to feel the effects the pregnancy has on her. The pregnancy is also 
described as a loop of technological interaction:
Her morning nausea wore off at last, and in its place came a sensation of power she'd not  
experienced before. Something inside her, solid and powerful, was giving her energy. Like a battery, 
she thought. A battery in her belly. She said nothing about it to Ajay. She didn't want him to know 
7     Braidotti’s view is linked to what Stacy Alaimo has termed the “material turn” in feminist theory, environmental studies and 
science studies.  Karen Barad has also called for a reassessment of the cultural from the perspective of the material:  “How did 
language come to be more trustworthy than matter? Why are language and culture granted their own agency and historicity while  
matter is figured as passive and immutable, or at best inherits a potential for change derivatively from language and culture?” (801.)
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how strong she was, how capable. She hid from him her growing competence with the world. (HW 
251.)
In Braidotti's perspective, the construction of a thinking subject can not be separated from 
that of a desiring subject. Thinking is seen as  “a tendency, a predisposition which expresses the 
outward-bound nature of the subject . . . a way of establishing connections with a multiplicity of 
impersonal forces” (Metamorphoses 70).  “Thinking”, in neomaterialist thought, is very much like 
the all-permeating “mind” in Ings' novels – largely non-conscious, affective and intensive. There is 
a pre-discursive moment in thinking, a passion for it, like the rippling of waves in the sea that is 
Presidio. This passion is also present in the descriptions of Hotwire's thinking cities – the city of Rio 
de Janeiro is expected to develop emergent consciousness on its own (without a human-assigned 
brand-name personality),  a tendency that is expressed in the material  flows of masses – traffic, 
football audiences, crime and carneval. Even if it is not conscious yet, the city can be said to “think” 
on some level – on the preconscious level of its living operationality. In Ings' novels, the conception 
of living matter leads to a particular brand of cybernetic animism.  
In  this  monistic  model  of  the  world,  there  is  no  categorical  difference  between  a 
Massive-made  datafat-body  and  an  earthmade  flesh-body.  Both  are  considered  thoroughly 
intelligent due to their living processes. However, it is crucial that Rosa is narratively constructed as 
different, as posthuman – without this defamiliarization it could be hard for a rationalist sf reader to 
accept the sense-making capacities of her living body. The posthuman signifies first and foremost a 
change in  the  conceptualization  of  subjectivity  – Rosa the posthuman is  Rosa the  human,  just 
conceptually organized in a slightly different manner. In creating a character that experiences the 
computational power of her biological system on a sensory level, Ings makes the reader consider the 
possibility of all bodies having “a life of their own” – and the limits of conscious control.
Conclusions
In Hot Head, Simon Ings utilizes the novum of datafat in developing a conception of subjectivity as 
an emergent effect produced in the interaction of multiple complex systems. Through the painful 
subjective experiences of the character Malise Arnim, he is able to convey some of the challenges 
inherent in the crisis of humanist thought: the loss of originality and heroism, and the disorientation 
of  a  character  whose  symbolic  construction  posits  her  as  the  subject  in  a  world  of  objects. 
Overcoming this dualism, and the dialectic of control and lack of control, is depicted as a slow and 
painful process. Malise is  constructed as a tragic character,  striving towards a goal that has no 
practical value in a fictional world where individual heroism has been replaced by the strategies of 
collective environmental adaptation. Malise cannot escape the systems that produce and define her 
any more than she can escape her own living body. 
Hotwire's Rosa evokes a  different  kind of subjectivity.  She is  produced as a  posthuman 
creature,  devoid  of  individualized  language  and agency.  In  the  narrative  construction  of  Rosa, 
datafat acquires a new purpose as a device enabling a conception of thoroughly intelligent flesh. 
Rosa  has  little  conscious  control  over  the  operations  between  her  flesh  and  the  technological 
environment.  However,  both  Rosa  and  Malise  find  ways  of  reducing  the  complexity  of  their 
respective environments. In Ings' prose, the strategies of adaptation acquire forms that would appear 
paranormal in any other context: tarot readings and animistic communication. In the logic of Ings' 
prose, these actions are constructed as thoroughly material – based on the premise of the living 
intentionality of matter itself.
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Ings' work is exceptional in its thorough utilization of systems-theoretical ideas and recent 
developments in cognitive science. Still, it is not the rational communication of ideas that makes the 
work exceptional, but the integration of these ideas into the representation of subjective experience. 
In Malise and Rosa, Ings manages to convey modes of experience that might be called 'posthuman 
subjectivity.
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